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ABSTRACT 
In contemporary literature on venture capital financial infrastructures are identified as major contributors to 
a large proportion of today’s innovations. Yet quite contradictory the literature on systems of innovation, 
hardly ever treat venture capitalists as a coherent actor in neither national nor regional innovation systems.  
In attempt to locate and determine the potentials and importance of the venture capitalists in the innovation 
system a two-dimensional taxonomy is constructed and used to illuminate their role and position. The 
taxonomy gains insights through theoretical reasoning and the possible location is exemplified by a case of 
the Danish venture capital market.    
It is argued in this article that venture capitalists stand a better chance of realizing their potential when they 
take and are given direct and formal responsibility in the innovation system. In relation hereto, the authors 
thus present initiatives to be taken to raise venture capitalists to a more direct and formal role in the context 
of systems of innovation. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Theoretical studies on venture capital closely link the existence of risk-seeking capital to 
the continuous development and formation of new products and processes (e.g. Kortum & 
Lerner 2000; Gompers & Lerner, 1999; Block & McMillan, 1993). Other studies indicate 
the relevance of network relations where innovation can happen as inter-organizational 
processes - often referred to as Systems of Innovation (e.g. Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993; 
Edquist, 1996; Chung, 2002; Niosi, 2002). This concept has emerged during the last 
decades especially working with defining the composition of innovation actors. Yet, most 
of the studies in the area of venture capital and venture capital management take place 
outside the system framework whereby the potential role and influence of venture capitalist 
in the innovation system to some extent is neglected. As a result venture capitalists are 
seldom mentioned as more than an important factor for innovation-based growth.  
This paper therefore aims at providing a more conceptual and theoretical understanding of 
the potential role and influence of venture capitalist in the innovation system. This is done 
by taking a systems approach i.e. positioning venture capitalists in relation to other actors 
in the innovation system. It is argued in this article that constructing a macro approach 
describing and positioning venture capitalists helps to create both the self-understanding 
within actor subsets and to define the broader institutional set-up. It is additionally argued 
that creating such understanding will support the possible synergies between actors in the 
innovation system. 
Based on a theoretical discussion and an exemplifying case about actors in the Danish 
market the paper analyses venture capitalists in the systems of innovation - in relation to 
mapping innovation actors and the relationships between these. Primary effort is put on 
discussing how to realize the potential of venture capitalists as collaborative innovation 
partners in the system.  
It is argued that incorporating financial structures, especially risk-seeking venture 
capitalists in collaborative arrangements (with different actors in the system of innovation) 
will cause macro economic benefits i.e. support the development of new technology based 
firms. By committing to a closer relationship to investees, venture capitalist will 
simultaneous gain strategic intelligence on markets, technologies etc. hereby enhancing 
their selective capacity. 
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Taking a financial perspective on innovation, a very fundamental element is the allocation 
of venture capital investments (Gompers & Lerner, 2000). Hellmann and Puri (2000) find 
that innovators stand a greater chance of receiving venture capital funding than imitators. 
Kortum and Lerner (2000) follow the same line of argumentation. They argue in a study on 
the relations between venture capital and innovation that:  
[…] “The empirical results … suggest that there is a strong association between venture 
capital and patenting and that corporate R&D and venture funding are highly 
substitutable in generating innovations” [p.682] 
Their analysis underlines the argument that venture capital funding can have a strong and 
positive impact on innovation (Kortum & Lerner, 2000). Thus, it is argued by both 
Hellmann and Puri (2000) and Kortum and Lerner (2000) that the reason for greater 
innovation success by venture-backed companies is due to the involvement of venture 
capitalist. Because there is a greater risk associated with early stage projects, venture 
capitalists are more concerned when it comes to maturing an investment. Venture 
capitalists in many cases look for a solid investment that is likely to be fast growing and 
provide an over average return (Bygrave et. al, 1992). Traditionally the relationship 
between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs is based on the flow of capital as an 
imbursement for entrepreneurial action. Investors and venture capitalists provide funding 
based on perceived future revenue streams.  
 
In markets for venture capital demand and supply are strongly separated: Supply of 
entrepreneurial action on the on hand and demand for such by venture capitalist on the 
other. Thornton (1999) argues that the entrepreneurship literature can be classified into two 
schools: one taking the supply-side perspective and the other, the demand-side perspective. 
“The supply-side school focuses on the availability of suitable individuals to occupy 
entrepreneurial roles; the demand-side, on the number and nature of the entrepreneurial 
roles that need to be filled” [p. 20]. Thornton (1999) argues that the ones taking the 
demand-side perspective suggests a number of ways to examine the context of 
organizational founding, such as the generation of new ventures by organizational 
hierarchies (Freeman, 1986), the activity of the professions (Wholey et al., 1993), the 
policy of nation-states (Dobbin & Doud, 1997), the development of markets (White, 1981, 
King & Levine, 1993), and the advent of technological change (Shane, 1996). Following 
this separation we discover a similar distinction of demand and supply. 
It has been commonly known that two separate markets exist: one governed by individual 
entrepreneurs and another dominated by venture capitalists. It is clear that firms 
(entrepreneurs) do not demand innovation services, consequently making it hard for 
innovation service suppliers (i.e. venture capitalists) to identify the innovation needs in the 
market (Oughton et. al, 2002). This separation is strongly embedded in what constitutes a 
marketplace, even though different actors and organizations represent both demand and 
supply.      
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Other similar attempts have been made to illuminate the potential of venture capitalists. In 
the entrepreneurship literature (e.g. Arrow, 1974; Evans & Jovanovic, 1989; Amit, Gloten 
& Muler, 1990) focus on micro processes and facilitation and exploitation as been 
predominant1. In the financial literature on venture capital (e.g. Gompers and Lerner, 1999) 
focus has been placed on individual portfolio strategies and optimal investment strategies, 
even though the macro economic benefits to some degree are acknowledged (Jaffe, 1996; 
Griliches, 1992). Within corporate entrepreneurship, venture capital has been a tool to 
improve innovation in large firms (e.g. Burgleman, 1983; Ginsberg & Hay, 1994; Husted 
& Vintergaard, forthcoming).  
Several researchers have discovered several economic drivers which influence the 
initiative for venture capitalist to engage in innovation e.g. the past performance of the 
venture capitalists (Balboa & Marti, 2000), GDP growth (Gompers & Lerner, 1998), the 
state of the IPO market (Jeng & Wells 2000; Black & Gilson, 1998) (Berlin, G&L) and, 
the stock market capitalisation growth (Jeng & Wells, 2000). However little of this 
literature has viewed venture capitalists as actors in macroeconomic context – to some 
degree neglecting the overall picture of how venture capital is related to other actors in the 
innovation system.      
 
1.1 STRUCTURING THE SYSTEM  
In order to ensure the most favourable involvement of venture capitalists in a larger macro 
economic perspective - i.e. to focus on the relationships that carry innovative capacity - 
there’s an evident need to understand the systems approach. A dominant part of the 
systems of innovation literature focuses on the national level and the central theoretical and 
empirical contributions within this approach has been published during the last decades by 
the work of Lundvall (1992), Nelson, 1993; Edquist, 1996, setting forth a framework 
allowing for a systems approach in understanding the possibilities and opportunities in 
innovation (Lundvall, 1992, 2000). The national perspective in analyzing the innovative 
capacity of nations has become widely diffused and is now an integral part of the analytical 
tool-box of such organizations as OECD and the European Commission.  
The functioning of the system rests on the ability for all actors to interact. Interaction is 
facilitated through proximity and collaborative initiatives; joint research activities and 
licensing agreements between public and private sector actors. In this capacity, private 
sector actors can access and leverage the pure science competencies generated in public 
organizations and institutions and the public sector can realize the transfer and application 
of its technology into commercially viable products; thus achieving objectives for 
enhanced social welfare. Investigating venture capitalists as actors in a macro perspective 
helps us illuminate the possible potential of venture capitalist in more general terms than a 
micro perspective would do. 
                                                 
1 Scott Shane (2002) II volume provides with a well-collected anthology on venture capital articles in an entrepreneurial 
perspective. 
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The main assertions in the innovation system are intuitively and empirically based on a set 
of components, the relations between those and the influence of institutions (Niosi 2002, 
Edquist 2001, Carlsson et. al 2002)2. The components comprise a set of interlinked 
organizations of which the core is constituted by those organizations that produce, use and 
diffuse new knowledge. Relations comprise the links between these organizations, be they 
of formal, informal, human, regulatory or of commercial kind.  A striking feature of the 
systems approach is the relevance of institutions. In the systems literature the term 
institutions is used to describe conceptually diffuse and heterogeneous set of underlying 
structures.  The concept of institutions is worked with from two angles, one as a complex 
set of normative structures, regimes, and routines (Lundvall, 2000) and another as formal 
and explicit organizations (Nelson and Rosenberg, 1993). Though it is not the purpose of 
this paper to theoretically clarify this duality it is important to stress that the term 
institutions in this paper falls between these two concepts and is used to describe both 
objects pattern behaviour and more formal organizations that create these objects. Yet, 
what is in our interest is to introduce the terms of formal and informal institutions. Formal 
institutions namely describe the abovementioned “formal organizations” while the 
informal institutions refer to the existence of attitudes, norms and behavioural patterns 
constituting the innovation culture. The formal institutions in the innovation system are 
often equal to Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff´s (1996) components in their Triple Helix 
model. 
The influence of informal institutions on the innovativeness of the national economy is 
only slightly touched upon in previous research of this kind. Yet, other contributions in 
scientific literature, outside the narrow definition of innovation systems, point to the fact 
that informal institutions are also decisive for the innovativeness of a national economy 
(Saxeenian 1994). Schertler (2002) have argued that a highly educated population might 
not be the same as a very entrepreneurial population with a lot of start-ups, but the very 
nature of the businesses that highly educated people are likely to start makes venture 
capital funding very relevant. 
Distinguishing formal and informal institutions becomes a key element. As argued by 
Carlsson et al. (2002; p. 242) ”A technological system has a number of different types of 
actors: firms, organizations, policy bodies, venture capitalists, etc. To evaluate the 
performance of a system, therefore, means to evaluate each of these players, not primarily 
as single entities, but connected in the entire system”. Even though this being the case a 
literature review on the perspectives of venture capitalists in the system reveals only 
limited attention to the potentials of venture capital in a macro economic context. As 
argued by Van Kersbergen and Waarden (2001)  “… the concept of institutions has mostly 
been reduced to organization sets that provide resources, possibilities, and constraints for 
innovation: banks, venture capital providers, research organizations, training 'institutes', 
unions, and standardization agencies. The literature recognizes that the organizations that 
                                                 
2 The discussion on how to formulate the exact properties of a National System of Innovation has many strands. Niosi 
2002 provides with a picture of the semantic core of the concept. 
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make up `national systems of innovations' are influenced by 'institutions', now used in the 
more specific meaning of `norms, habits, conventions and rules' of a society. However, the 
latter remain largely unexplored”. By looking at some of the ways researches have 
perceived venture capitalist in relation to the system of innovation much of this seems 
plausible. It becomes evident that venture capitalists are not considered as a direct actor 
subset in the system but merely as a resource provider. Many scholars within systems of 
innovation have implicitly treated venture capitalist in this way, i.e. (Lundvall, 1992; 
Nelson, 1993; Edquist, 1996, Freeman 1999). Fremann argues in Venture Capital as an 
Economy of Time (1999) that venture capitalists are an important participant in the 
innovative process as they provide funding for new ventures and also help build the new 
ventures. He further argues that this is done by making social connections to other 
important actors and by for instance providing advice. 
This leads us to be believe that Van Kersbergen and Waarden (2001) arguments are also 
valid for venture capitalists. As indicated venture capitalists are predominantly viewed as 
resource providers, making their exact role and potential blurred and difficult to analyse. 
To an even greater extent it becomes difficult to determine what makes them distinct from 
the other actors in the innovation system. Consequently their relations to other actors in the 
innovation system and their possible position and role in the innovation systems become 
open-ended.   
In the following a Danish case has been selected as an illustrative example of the 
arguments presented in the paper. The case serves an practical illustration of how venture 
capitalists have tried to position them self’s in relation other innovation actors.    
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2 VENTURE CAPITALISTS IN THE DANISH SYSTEM OF INNOVATION 
In order to provide examples of the current role and positions of venture capitalists in the 
innovation system, the following case functions as illustration. The empirical evidence 
offers a rich illustration of how venture capitalists perceive themselves in relation to actors 
in the innovation system.  
The case is based on 25 in-debt interviews conducted with top and middle managers of 
venture capital firms from a selective representation of industries. This resulted in more 
then 100 hours of interview. Each interview has been taped recorded and later transcribed. 
The interviewees all hold jobs in a diverse set of venture capital companies - with diverse 
investment strategies and industry focus. Every investor holds a central position in top 
management. Additionally the case is based on material such as peer review articles, 
books, news services, venture capital statistics etc.   
 
2.1 ROLE AND POSITION IN THE INNOVATION SYSTEM 
The Danish venture capital market is relatively young compared to the rest of the European 
countries and especially the United States. The market was initiated in the late 70’s and the 
early 80’s. From 1982 to 1985, 10-15 new venture funds were established. The positive 
development, however, did not last and a few years later the number was reduced to only a 
few (Christensen, 1998, 2000). After this downturn, it took almost 10 years before focus 
once again was on venture capital in Denmark. In 1992 the establishment of the 
governmental institution: the Danish Investment Fund again shaded light on the 
entrepreneurs. The focus has remained since 1994 although the market experienced a 
downturn after the year 2000. Today, the market for venture capital is growing, which is 
supported by statistics concluding that the total number of venture capital companies 
increased from 33 in 1998 to almost 80 today (EVCA, Vækstfonden 2003). 
 
The Danish venture capital industry is still trying to find its feet and define what kind of 
role it should play in the innovation system. Lars Bruhn, managing partner of the venture 
capital company IVS A/S and chairman of the Danish Venture Capital Association, clearly 
indicates states: "I hope that we will get more venture capitalists in the market that take 
active part in influencing the political agenda". Trends towards a more mature market 
have however started to show. As an example it can be mentioned that the Danish Venture 
Capital Association (DVCA) increasingly is making an impact. In 2002 and 2003 DVCA 
has established several committees in order to influence the political agendas and ensure 
the right climate for venture capitalists. Trends towards a greater interest in developing the 
market have however started to show by the Danish Government. The Danish Venture 
Capital Association (DVCA) increasingly is making an impact and succeeded in getting 5 
out of 10 suggestions accepted by the government in 2003.  DVCA has established several 
committees in order to influence the political agendas and ensure the right climate for 
venture capitalists. The latest committee, which has been established, is trying to support 
and promote education in entrepreneurship and venture capital. This initiative also tries to 
Venture capitalists in the innovation system 
Munk & Vintergaard, 2004  Page 10 of 23 
create the link between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. Other committees are 
responsible for supplying historical market data, which can later be used, or decision-
making and international comparison.  
It is argued by Thor Birkmand, Futuri Invest, manager of Slottsbacken Funds, that such 
initiatives are needed as“…entrepreneurs are not as well aware of venture capital to help 
them grow their business as in many other countries”. He further argues, “… as a result of 
the immature Danish market many entrepreneurs perceive venture capitalists as hunters 
that shoots around and pick up whatever ends of on the floor”. He however also stress that 
many venture capitalists operate in an immature fashion – in most senses more like 
traditional financial institutions than as venture capitalists. Most of the initiatives in DVCA 
still remain on the basis of volunteers. In order to gain more momentum on a macro 
economical level Thomas Weilby Knudsen (Chief Financial Officer) Internetventures 
Scandinavia A/S ads “Even though IVS do not formally have a task in this context, we do 
prioritise active work in organizations such as DVCA [Danish Venture Capital 
Association] and other organizations, in order to improve conditions for innovation”…“As 
IVS is dependent on attractive investment cases, it is part of our concern”. These 
statements give indications that only a limited proportion of the Danish venture capital 
industry has yet started to influence agendas on macro economic level – becoming a more 
formalised group of actors. As part of this development a number of actors see the 
possibilities and incitements to pursue a more formal existence in the innovation system. 
In relation to governmental influence, venture capitalists are also seeking additional help 
too boost the support to new ventures. Poul Andersson, CEO of the investment company 
BioVision, says “When venture funds move to a higher level on the scale of risk they leave 
an open gab where there is no funds to push the companies further on. If the early projects 
are not to die out there is more then ever a need for the government to take on a proactive 
role”. In this relation Mark Sonne Kharazmi from Danske Venture Partners argues that 
venture capitalists has just initiated actions that will influence government decisions. This 
initiative included a list of practical initiatives to improve the conditions for venture 
capitalists. Mark Sonne Kharazmi further argues that venture capitalists are starting to find 
niches in which they can specialize. Thereby they will create a broader interface with the 
market, and become known to a larger group of actors.  
A large proportion of new venture capitalists in the market spend most of their time on 
developing their business structure while spending limited energy on positioning activities 
e.g. influencing the degree of innovation. This indicates little interest in fertilizing the 
grounds for new innovations.   
Many Danish venture capitalists’ count on the educational system to provide good 
investment opportunities. In relation to the educational system Henrik Albertsen, 
Managing partner, CEO of the Danish venture capital company Nordic Venture Partners 
expresses:” We need to have an educational system, which is of international standard. Its 
our job to discover, evaluate and capitalize on this research”. A similar quote from 
Thomas Weilby Knudsen (Chief Financial Officer) position the role of Internetventures 
Scandinavia A/S (IVS) in the Danish innovation system: “IVS sees its role as twofold: as a 
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facilitator of the innovative environment, and as a partner. The facilitator role is visible 
through our promotion and investment in companies, thus creating further growth and 
success stories about innovative entrepreneurs who succeed in building a business. As a 
partner IVS is highly dependent on sourcing for its investments opportunities. The 
innovative environment is an important source”. Directed by the quotes it becomes 
obvious that the role ascribed to venture capitalists is very focused on the area of 
facilitating the innovation process, rarely taking active part in actual creation. This goes 
hand in hand with the early theoretical separation of markets. In relation to the 
involvement the following quote answers the question of whether Internetventures 
Scandinavia A/S takes active part in the innovation process: “No, however, we do spend 
effort on improving conditions for entrepreneurs on different levels” says Thomas Weilby 
Knudsen. 
The practical distinction of markets is very much grounded in traditional financial funding 
as provided by banks and other credit institutions. The common perceived value-adding 
element of venture capitalist lies in their ability to help entrepreneurs develop their idea 
into a viable business. These quotes provide some empirical perspectives: “We meet 
entrepreneurs who believe that having a significant technology is equal to a brilliant 
firm… it is one of our obligations to make these evaluations and aid management and 
entrepreneurs to best possible approach the market and then later on bring these to 
market” (Thor Birkmand, Futuri Invest, manager of Slottsbacken Funds). An additional 
quote further underline this point: “It is our role to provide capital, but also advise and 
make resources available that the entrepreneur didn’t have access to before” Helle Busck 
Fensvig, Partner, Danske Life Science. Helle Busck Fensvig further argues “This type of 
active involvement in the investment is something that is often stated by Danish venture 
capitalists, but something that they rarely do”. Venture capitalist are however well aware 
that innovation is the main fuel for their business model. Indirect action for improving such 
conditions has therefore also started to be formulated as direct proposal to the government. 
DVCA tries through its committees to ensure that the pipeline is filled with new venture 
ideas, while at the same time creating general support to the industry.      
The case provides examples as to how venture capitalists see themselves in the innovation 
system. Venture capitalists only in rare cases take part in the process of idea creation and 
consequently early phase innovation – a feature very much connected to a less developed 
financial market. Consequently venture capitalists are not viewed as a direct component in 
the system as such, but function as a facilitating sub-layer providing innovations with 
financial recourses for it to develop. Yet, some venture managers from the Danish case 
indicate that the sector is in a transitional phase and that in future perspective venture 
capitalists might gain enough market intelligence to identify special viable opportunities in 
the market and later on act on these. It becomes clear that many of the theoretical point on 
separation on markets also are present in this case. The case also provides an indication 
that the degree of involvement in innovation is only one parameter when mapping their 
role and importance; the level of formality as an actor subset is equally important. A better 
understanding of this connection is provided in the coming chapter. 
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3 CREATING CONCENUS 
As indicated in the previous case and theoretical rationalization venture capitalists can take 
on several positions in the innovation system and also contribute to the systems in diverse 
ways. As pointed out, venture capitalists provide financial resources for innovation as the 
bulk of traditional financial institutions do. However their financial strategy differs on 
several parameters to traditional credit institutions, such as risk profile and complementary 
resources etc. (Gompers & Lerner, 1999). Partly due to these reasons the services rendered 
by venture capitalist differ significantly from traditional credit institutions. By examining 
venture capitalists in previous research and in the case, insights into their role and position 
are improved. 
It is historically grounded that venture capitalists are not as publicly known as other 
financial institutions. The early rise of the venture capital industry and its development 
towards maturity was initially constituted of “business angles”. A common characteristic 
of these business angels was that these were individual investors investing their private 
money (Mason and Harrison, 1992). Quite obvious these single individuals, not being part 
of a larger organization, were not as identifiable as the larger organization in the 
institutional landscape (Fenn and Liang 1998). Theses elements have however shifted in 
mature venture areas yet we find these characteristics present in the Danish case. 
Comparing mature and immature venture capital industries thus show conspicuous 
differences in the degree by which venture capitalist have established themselves around a 
professional body or community. Evidently Danish venture capitalists to a less degree have 
established themselves as actor subset or community whereby their official appearance as a 
collective in the innovation context is blurred. This problem is in many cases due to the 
fact that venture capitalists to a large extent have relied on their informal relations and 
specifically their ‘nose’ for sniffing up the good investment proposals –reserving fewer 
resources for positioning activities. Mitchell Berlin (1998) argues that most venture capital 
firms often consist of small independent partnerships with a professional staff of between 
six and 12 people, including a few general partners and a small number of associates who 
are venture capitalists in training. This naturally makes the individual venture capitalist 
appear less formal than traditional banks, which are far greater in size (Berlin, 1998). 
John Callahan and Steven Muegge (2003) argues that only “In rare instances, a venture 
capitalist may become involved in the development of a new venture before it is ready for 
investments of the size and type appropriate for VCs. More commonly, however, the deals 
seek out the VC, who often maintains a high profile in their investment community – 
spending significant amounts of time at business events and conferences. The timing of VC 
financial entry into an opportunity can depend greatly on the supply of and demand for 
good opportunities by VCs”. Following this line of argumentation researchers such 
Hellman (1997) stress that if investors play an active role in the development new start-up 
companies, the identity of the investor becomes an important determinant of the venture 
process. Trying to deal with this problem venture capitalists often make syndicate 
investments and exchange good proposals (Amit, Glosten, & Muller, 1990).  
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Even though research in this area is only an indirect representation of venture capitalists 
practice it does give a clear indication on how the relationship is between the innovation 
system and venture capitalists. Venture capitalists can primarily be seen as organizations 
that are willing to provide risk-willing capital in return for an abnormal payoff (e.g. Block 
& McMillan, 1993). A central issue is to be found in the strong separation of markets. 
Venture capitalist and the primary innovation network often does not see one another to 
have inter-correlated interests. There is a strong belief that separate organisations should 
do what they are best at (Thornton, 1999). In this way the components and relations in the 
system of innovation should be the ones providing innovations and venture capitalists 
should be the ones, exploiting these opportunities (Sarasvathy, Dew, Velamuri and 
Venkatarman, 2003). 
A partial reason for this indirect position in relation to the innovation system is stemming 
from a strong belief that venture capitalists cannot contribute with any value in the 
innovative process. There is a common perception that the value that these organisations 
render should be brought in much later in the process: i.e. exploring the opportunities, 
staffing, growing the business etc. It is often argued that venture capitalists play a critical 
rule in the innovation process, not only as a source of finance to innovation but through 
other functions that lie at the core of high tech development (Burgelman, 1985). Another 
reason for the level of directness in the approach of the venture capitalists might also be 
found in not knowing where and how the contribution should take place. The venture 
capital actors in many cases carry traditions from traditional funding; such as we know it 
from banks and other financial institutions.  
 
3.1 TAXONOMY  
Condensing the illustrations from the Danish case and the present research of venture 
capitalists in the system of innovation a framework starts to take shape. The clarity by 
which venture capitalists operate in the system with clear tasks to fulfil is only in the 
making in the Danish case. This development can be seen in perspective of network theory, 
where there is an increased focus on formal or informal positions as the locus of innovation 
(Pyka 1997, Waldstrøm 2001, Dahl 2002, Cross et. al., 2002). These theories help to 
provide one dimension of the position of venture capitalists: formality or informality. This 
dimension of formality/informality helps us determine the possible potential of venture 
capitalists and also provide an important element in the taxonomy. This determines to what 
degree venture capitalist known in the system. The analytical context, when looking at 
formal/informal factors influencing innovation, implicitly touches upon the extent and 
scope by which formal and informal entities influence innovation. Adapting the 
formal/informal terms to the taxonomy with connection to the innovation process also 
reveal the concepts of direct/indirect influence on the innovation process i.e. are the actors 
formally or informally involved in the innovation process and is the involvement direct or 
indirect. Direct/ indirect naturally refers to the degree involvement in the innovative 
process. 
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As the purpose of the present paper is to analyse the potential of venture capitalists in the 
system of innovation as well as their influence on the system, the criteria of 
formal/informal actors and of direct/indirect participation in innovation are chosen to 
support the line of argumentation. From the Danish case it becomes evident that 
formal/informal and direct/indirect are central dimensions when mapping venture 
capitalists in the innovation system. What appears is a multi-dimensional taxonomy 
categorizing central institutions in the system of innovation. As analytical criteria these 
create a two-dimensional taxonomy in which it is possible to position the components in 
the innovation system. In relation to the taxonomy the location of the venture capitalists 
can later on be carried out in perspectives of various inputs from research as well as the 
Danish case. It should be noted that this builds on the assumption that the two dimensions 
of the variables varies between high and low. Yet, this categorization helps to disclose and 
systematize the components and relations involved in innovation in a quadrant model.  
4. Values and attitudes
•Innovation culture (norms, business ethics, 
trust, technology adaption, routines etc.)
•Historical development  of the educational and 
financial subsystem (path dependency, lock-in)
•Technology (Digital infrastructure)
2. Background innovation facilitation
•Educational system
•Legislative procedures
•Policy system (competition policy)
•Banks and credit institutions
•Interest groups (industry based)
3. Reflexivity and action patterns
•Social relationships and networks
•University-Industry relations
•Industry-policy relationship 
•Cooperative/Competitive behaviour (Inter-firm 
relationships)
•Reflexivity
1. Primary innovation network
•Scientific community (Universities, Public 
research institutions etc.)
•Industry (MNCs, SMEs, start-ups, spin-offs etc.)
•Technology transfer offices
•Policy system (S&T policy and policy 
programmes)
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Figure 1: Components and relations in the innovation system3  
3.1.1 Primary innovation network (Formal/direct) 
The primary innovation network is basically constituted of the explicit core of the 
innovation system (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorf 1996; Nowotny et. al, 2001). As can be seen, 
the group comprises public research institutions and universities as well as private 
companies – yet all with direct responsibility for the generation and application of new 
knowledge within their fields and at the same time participating in collaborative 
arrangements and networks. The entities in this quadrant of the figure are the same that are 
worked with in the theories of the triple helix (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorf, 1996) and the 
mode 2 knowledge production (Gibbons, 1994, Novotny et. al, 2001).  
                                                 
3 Inspiration comes from Schloser 1999. Look to Liu and White 2001 for another taxonomy. 
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As an example, the development of S&T policy and the diffusion of these highly influence 
the processes of innovation as well as implementing programmes that facilitate the 
development of new technologies and set forth future research goals. A collective 
characteristic of the group is a close and continuous interaction with other components in 
the innovation system and awareness of their position and contribution to the system as a 
whole.  
3.1.2 Background innovation facilitation (Formal/indirect) 
Background innovation facilitation represents formal components indirectly affecting the 
innovation system – not as directly carrying innovations from idea stage to actual 
development but through their influence on the systems ability to actually run. Taking the 
example of the policy system it is evident that the development of policies that support 
business goals are essential otherwise hampering firms autonomy of action. The 
educational systems can be regarded from the same perspective – feeding the system with 
both qualified manpower and knowledge needed to develop new products and processes. 
Shertler (2002) conclude that human capital, defined as the number of people employed in 
research and development relative to the total labour force, is a good explanation for the 
level of venture capital i.e. the higher the percentage of the workforce that works in 
research and development, the more often they innovate. 
3.1.3 Reflexivity and action patterns (Informal/direct) 
This section deals with the same agents as the first, but the starting point here is the 
relational network. The informal character of the factors constituting this quadrant has 
proven to influence innovation to a great length. While these factors often are not bound 
within any formal organization, they frequently are the sources of both strategic and 
operational success. Studies (e.g. analysing collaborative arrangements between 
universities and industry) are increasingly pointing towards the importance of informal 
networks. (Powell, 1996; Jones et. al, 1997, Lundvall, 1992)  
The most indicative examples of informal networks are the networks of individuals – 
constituted by former fellow students, colleagues etc. Moreover many organizations have 
placed themselves in networks of informal character. Networks of this kind first and 
foremost exist because they bring people together and because there’s a need for 
continuous cultivation of ones network (Pyka, 1997).   
3.1.4 Values and attitudes (Informal/indirect) 
This section comprises a sub layer of historical and cultural features that primarily show 
themselves as attitudes and behavioural patterns in society – entrepreneurial culture 
(Hornsby, Kuratko & Zahra, 2002).  
The layer can be characterized as the innovation culture from which entrepreneurial 
behaviour, risk-willingness, adaption of new technologies and general social attitude 
towards the system as a whole emerges (Kuratko, Hornsby, Naffziger & Montagno, 1993). 
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These factors influence the behaviour on markets, strategic decisions and political 
processes, thus indirectly influencing the innovation processes.  
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4 DISCUSSION  
Four different positions are revealed in the previous figure and indicate that there are both 
institutional and organization overlaps between the quadrants. At this point it is important 
to emphasise that one quadrant in the taxonomy is not better then the other, but each 
quadrant carries specific benefits depending on the task at hand. It will however be argued 
that in order use and exploit the potentials of venture capitalists in the innovation system 
the best foundation will be a formal direct position. From this position venture capitalists 
will have a better starting point for influencing the agendas in the other quadrants and 
contribute to the overall performance of the system.  
During the innovation process, it is important that venture capitalists recognise and finance 
commercially viable opportunities (Stasch, 1994). They represent a vital actor subset for 
the innovation system to perform. As consequence of separation of markets venture 
capitalists however often take an informal and indirect part in early phase of innovations 
even though studies indicate that direct and formal involvement host potential value for the 
venture capitalists (Husted & Vintergaard, forthcoming).  
Venture capitalists are highly dependent on accessing new unique ventures, which can 
provide them significant return – the “raw material” in their business model. In addition it 
is argued that one of the most significant impediments for many companies is too few 
mainstream ideas (Block & MacMillan, 1993; Tidd et al., 2001) If venture capitalists 
haven’t got access to a sufficient number of unique ideas, the venture unit will not be able 
to create a sufficient number of profitable ventures and will eventually cease (Block & 
MacMillan, 1993:94). Etzkowitz et. al (2001) stresses that also in relation to 
commercialisation of university science this largely depends on a marriage between 
venture capital and university scientists. Such involvement will also benefit the innovation 
system by providing better exploitation of the capabilities and resources which venture 
capitalists possesses i.e. increase the level of innovation. 
It is argued in this article that through a more formal and direct role in the innovation 
system, venture capitalists will surpass the position as intermediaries and will gain access 
to a larger stream of ideas. Obtaining this position is however only achieved through 
collective means. Venture capitalists have to learn to become more proactive and direct 
partners in the process of innovation while also ensuring a more formal position. Pari 
passu, it is also important that other actors and the policy system support this process. Only 
through a collective effort will the system harvest from a new actor group in the system.   
Even though reconfiguration of the venture capitalist in the innovation taxonomy model 
has appealing outputs there are strong demands on the venture capitalist as a specific group 
of actors and on the rest of the actors in the system. In order for venture capitalists to 
achieve the possible benefits of innovation and achieve a direct and formal position in the 
system several actions can be proposed: 
Dynamic participation. The first initial consideration is to establish concrete actions in 
order to achieve a fruitful position in the innovation system. In order for this to manifest 
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itself proactive initiatives need to be taken from the collective of venture capitalists. 
Simultaneous efforts from other actors of the ”primary innovation network” to include and 
use venture capitalist in their innovative actions should happen. The reason to take active 
part in the system as such is naturally twofold: 1) for venture capitalists to gain access to 
and benefit from innovations (Vintergaard & Husted, forthcoming) and 2) in order to 
facilitate the system as such. As earlier illustrated, indicators have shown that active 
involvement in the process leads to a potential higher profit. Simultaneous direct and 
formal participation will also enhance the facilitation of the other parts of the system of 
innovation. As illustrated in the relation of demand a supply, it is often taken for granted 
that innovations and thereby entrepreneurs automatically generate venture ideas and that 
no initiatives are necessary to facilitate them. The type of actions that can be proposed 
could be to accommodate stronger ties between venture capitalists, universities, 
government and other parts of the ”primary innovation network”. 
Setting agendas. In order to achieve a formal position in the innovation system an 
important element is to take part in influencing agendas (political and institutional) in the 
formal and informal networks that constitute the relations between different components in 
the innovation system. Doing this will enhance the position and resource allocation and 
focus will shift the desired direction. In order to achieve such a position, the venture capital 
actors must nevertheless learn where and how to position themselves in such a structure. 
Huxham and Vangen (2000) argue that: “Structures thus play an important leadership role 
because they determine such key factors as: who has an influence on shaping a partnership 
agenda, which has power to act, and what resources are tapped.” They further argue that 
when the structure of collaboration is part of a system of multiple overlapping partnerships, 
the influence on the agenda may be even more significant (Huxham & Vangen, 2000). By 
taking active part in influencing the agendas in the network, corporations will also have a 
greater chance of gaining a central position in the network. 
Reconfigure the innovation network. Knowledge on how to position oneself, influence the 
common agenda and to actively interact in the innovation system is essential. Given 
proactive presence in the network, one quite evidently becomes more interesting as a 
collaborative partner (Powell et. al, 1996, Cross et. al, 2002). In general it is often 
important to understand the extent to which the network as a whole is reliant on one both 
as individual and as group. Understanding how ones enactment might impact connectivity 
and information flow is critical to ensuring network resiliency. The network relations 
discussed above of course applies within the systems of innovation. As argued by Seufert 
et. al 1999: “the locus of innovation should be thought of as a network of inter-
organizational relations”[p.181]. In relation to the presence in the system of innovation he 
further argues that successful organizations position themselves at the hubs in the centre of 
overlapping networks stimulating rewarding research collaborations among the various 
actors. 
A direct position in the system cannot be based purely on facilitating the system. A central 
task for the primary innovation network is learning how to interact and create networks in 
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order to be able to manage their position in the innovation system (Powell et. al, 1996). 
Seufert, Krogh and Bach (1999) argue that individuals in an organization should be able to 
recognize personally relevant knowledge within the organization, which can be exploited. 
The ability to create and participate in a network and to contextualize one’s knowledge 
(Gibbons et. al, 2001) has to be seen as something that can be learned, but also something 
that often depends on personal traits.    
Have something to offer and can absorb. Following the above argumentation the actors in 
the primary innovation network need to engage in network formation, and also have 
something to offer in terms of their own level of knowledge production, reputation etc. 
Venture capitalists will not become part of a value-creating innovation system unless they 
can contribute with something that is not already present in the network. However other 
actors in the systems also need to learn how to make use of the resources and capabilities 
which venture capitalists posses. Powell et al. (1996) argue that a partnering decision 
depends on each partner’s size and position in the “value-chain” and the level of 
technological sophistication. They further argue that to remain current in a rapidly moving 
field an organization must be involved in the research process. Passive recipients of new 
knowledge are less likely to appreciate or be able to respond rapidly. In industries where 
knowledge is crucial, companies must be experts in both in-house research and in 
cooperative research with external partners, such as university scientists, research 
organizations, and skilled competitors.  
 
4.1 CONCLUSION 
Following the reasoning above venture capitalists, presently informal entities in the 
system, need to become a formal and direct part of the industry – a shift demanding 
collective effort. Eventually they will follow temporary trajectories into the formal and 
direct sphere and gain advantage of the move. The shift is not to be seen as binding the 
venture capitalists to a distinct area or place within the primary innovation network or the 
background innovation facilitation – yet it constitutes a shift in self-perception and the 
degree and type of interaction with other key innovation actors.  
Conclusively, it is important to note, that what the venture capitalists are actually feeding 
on is the formality, or rather the rigidity of institutions affecting the other primary network 
actors. Values and attitudes are namely holding the formal actors in rigid positions, 
eventually preventing i.e. banks and credit institutions from providing the innovation 
system with services comparable to those delivered by venture capitalists. So the event of 
combining a formalized and direct involvement in innovation while at the same influencing 
the formation of norms and values as well as becoming present in network relations e.g. 
brokering in university-industry relations is important. 
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